In past articles of this blog, I speculated that the killing of Ashli Babbitt in the US Capitol Building on January 6, 2021, was a hoax. Eventually I renounced that speculation and removed most of those articles from this blog. I recognize that Babbitt indeed was killed.
A week ago, on January 3, 2022, the PBS website published an article titled Ashli Babbitt, Jan. 6 insurrectionist portrayed as martyr by some, had violent past. That article indicated to me that Babbitt suffered a mental disorder of some kind. Specifically, she seems to me to have been manic-depressive -- in other words, suffering from bipolar disorder.
The article tells how Ashli -- previously named Ashli McEntee -- had an affair with a man, Aaron Babbitt, who was involved in a six-year relationship with a woman named Celeste Norris. The McEntee-Babbitt affair broke up the Norris-Babbitt relationship. Celestine Norris dumped Aaron Babbitt, and then immediately Ashli McEntee moved in with Babbitt and eventually married him, thus becoming Ashli Babbitt. During the course of this romantic drama, Ashli physically attacked Norris in 2016. Some legal proceedings followed, but Babbitt was acquitted of the criminal charges.
Although Babbitt was acquitted of the criminal charges, she seems to be to have been an extraordinarily impulsive and violent person.
The article gave me a better perspective on Ashli Babbitt's fatal decision to climb through that broken window in the Capitol Building on January 6, 2021.
Sunday, January 9, 2022
Friday, October 15, 2021
Steele's Dossier Report About Alfa Bank -- Part 2
Part 1
=======
For the sake of convenience, I will use the expression "the Alfa Bank suspicion" for the idea that there was some communications between Alfa Bank and Donald Trump in relation to the 2016 Presidential election race.
======
In relation to the Alfa Bank suspicion, here are some key dates:
The Horowitz report summarized Steele's September 23 briefing of Ohr as follows (Pages 274-275; Page 119, Footnote 259):
======
Among Steele's Dossier reports that are available to the public, only Report 112 mentions Alfa Bank. Report 112 does not say anything at all about the US election, in particular about Trump, or about a Russian/American organization using an Alfa Bank server.
Here is the end of the series of Dossier reports that are available to the public:
There is another significant gap between Report 113 (September 14) and Report 130 (October 12). Within that gap, Steele told Ohr on September 23 that the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce had used the Alfa Bank server.
During both those gaps, Steele surely wrote more Dossier reports about the Alfa Bank suspicion, and all such reports were delivered promptly to the FBI Counterintelligence Chief.
======
Continued in Part 3
=======
For the sake of convenience, I will use the expression "the Alfa Bank suspicion" for the idea that there was some communications between Alfa Bank and Donald Trump in relation to the 2016 Presidential election race.
======
In relation to the Alfa Bank suspicion, here are some key dates:
About September 9, 2016
Sergei Millian’s Russian-American Chamber of Commerce used the Alfa Bank server (Pages 274-275; Page 119, Footnote 259)
September 14, 2016
Christopher Steele completed Dossier Report 112
September 19, 2016
The FBI's Crossfire Hurricane team officially received its first Dossier reports (80, 94, 95, 100, 101, 102) (Page 100)
September 19, 2016
Michael Sussman briefed FBI General Counsel James Baker
September 23, 2016
Steele briefed DOJ Associate Deputy Attorney General Bruce Ohr (Page 274)
October 11, 2016
Steele briefed State Department Assistant Secretary Kathleen Kavalec (Page 117)
November 2, 2016
The FBI thought there could be an innocuous explanation (Foer)
November 6, 2016
The FBI's Crossfire Hurricane team received Report 112 from Baker, who had received it from a Mother Jones journalist (Page 119, Footnote 259)
Early February 2017
The FBI concluded that there were no links between the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank
The Horowitz report summarized Steele's September 23 briefing of Ohr as follows (Pages 274-275; Page 119, Footnote 259):
... Steele also discussed allegations that an Alfa Bank server in the United States was a link between Russia and the Trump campaign; that Person 1's Russian/American organization [Sergei Millian’s Russian-American Chamber of Commerce] in the United States had used the Alfa Bank server [two weeks] earlier in September [i.e., on about September 9] ...
======
Among Steele's Dossier reports that are available to the public, only Report 112 mentions Alfa Bank. Report 112 does not say anything at all about the US election, in particular about Trump, or about a Russian/American organization using an Alfa Bank server.
Here is the end of the series of Dossier reports that are available to the public:
Report 101, dated August 10, 2016There is a significant gap between Report 105 (August 22) and Report 111 (September 14). Within that gap, on about September 9, Millian’s Russian-American Chamber of Commerce used the Alfa Bank server.
Report 102, dated August 10, 2016
Report 105, dated August 22, 2016
Report 111, dated September 14, 2016
Report 112, dated September 14, 2016
Report 113, dated September 14, 2016
Report 130, dated October 12, 2016
Report 134, dated October 18, 2016
Report 135, dated October 19, 2016
Report 136, dated October 20, 2016
There is another significant gap between Report 113 (September 14) and Report 130 (October 12). Within that gap, Steele told Ohr on September 23 that the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce had used the Alfa Bank server.
During both those gaps, Steele surely wrote more Dossier reports about the Alfa Bank suspicion, and all such reports were delivered promptly to the FBI Counterintelligence Chief.
======
Continued in Part 3
Sunday, October 10, 2021
The Continuing Disappearance of Dossier Report 96
Below is a list of the first 12 of the Dossier reports that have become available to the public.
======
In this blog, I have speculated that all these 12 reports (except Reports 80 and 86) were delivered unofficially to the FBI Counterintelligence Chief promptly after their publication dates. For example, Report 94 was delivered to that Chief within a few days of its publication date -- July 19 -- but its delivery was not recorded according to FBI procedures. Report 94 was delivered officially -- recorded according to FBI procedures -- on September 19. On that official delivery date, however, the Counterintelligence Chief already had possessed the report unofficially since mid-July.
The reason for the abnormal delivery of Dossier reports was to enable the FBI to deny its knowledge of some of the reports.
For example, Steele finished writing Report 94 (and assigned that number to the report) on July 19. Within a few days, that report was delivered to the Counterintelligence Chief, but that delivery was not recorded according to FBI procedures.
By a different delivery method, Report 94 was delivered on July 28 to the Chief Division Counsel FBI New York Field Office (NYFO) -- not to FBI Headquarters. This delivery to the NYFO was recorded according to FBI procedures. On July 28, therefore, the FBI could no longer deny that the FBI -- in particular, the FBI NYFO -- had received Report 94, but it still could deny that FBI Headquarters had received it. (When the NYFO received any Dossier reports, the NYFO simply hid them in a safe until further instructions were received from from FBI Headquarters.)
Later, in mid-September, someone decided that the current situation allowed Report 94 to be delivered officially to FBI Headquarters. This belated delivery was recorded in accordance with FBI procedures on September 19. From this latter date forward, FBI headquarters would have to acknowledge that it had been informed about Report 94.
======
The delivery of Report 97 was different. Like Report 94, it was delivered to the Counter-intelligence Chief promptly and unofficially. However, Report 97 was not delivered to the NYFO. Therefore, the FBI created no record at all that Report 97 had been delivered to any FBI office at all. Officially, Report 97 was delivered to the FBI the first time on September 19. Until that latter date, the FBI avoided creating any record indicating any FBI knowledge of the existence of Report 97.
I speculated in a previous blog article that the FBI might be more embarrassed by Report 97 (than, for example, by Report 94), because Report 97 indicated that Christopher Steele was obtaining information from sources with inside knowledge about Trump's election-campaign staff. In particular, Report 97 claimed to be based partially on reports from "a Russian émigré figure close to the Republican US presidential candidate Donald Trump's campaign team". That phrase -- which eventually might cause the public to suspect that the FBI was collecting information from inside Trump's campaign staff -- might have caused the decision in July 2016 to not send Report 97 to the NYFO.
By mid-September, however, the situation had changed. Now the FBI Headquarters was trying to overcome objections to its application for a FISA warrant in order to collect information about Trump's supporters. Therefore, FBI Headquarters now had to receive officially some Dossier reports. In particular, Reports 97 now seemed to FBI Headquarters to be more useful than problematical. After all, the Russian émigré reported the following (emphasis added):
In mid-September, FBI Headquarters foresaw a need to use this information in order to obtain a FISA warrant. Therefore, FBI Headquarters belatedly arranged for Report 97 to be received in accordance with FBI procedures. Keep in mind, though, that the Counterintelligence Chief actually had received Report 97 already in July.
==========
Reports 96, 98 and 99 remain mysterious to the present day. The only facts that might be deduced about those three reports is their approximate dates.
Now I have come across a clue to the date of Report 96. I learned recently that journalist Jane Mayer -- who had interviewed Steele at length -- mentioned in an article that Steele had published an article dated July 26, 2016. Mayer's article was titled Christopher Steele, the Man Behind the Trump Dossier, and it was published by The New Yorker magazine on March 5, 2018. The relevant paragraph (emphasis added):
Since Dossier Report 95 is not dated, the report dated July 26, 2016 must be Report 96. Although Report 96 never has become available to the public, Mayer apparently was told something about it by Steele himself.
If Mayer's summary of Report 96 is correct, then that report's huge problem for the FBI is its indication that some Democrat officials ("agents within the Democratic Party structure itself") had participated in the supposed hacking of the Democrat National Committee's computers in the spring of 2016. Therefore, Report 96 might be extremely damaging to the FBI's efforts to blame such hacking on an imaginary collaboration between Russian Intelligence and Donald Trump. For that reason, the FBI has kept Report 96 secret to the present day.
==========
The dating of Report 96 to July 26 indicates that undated Report 95 was written between July 19 (Report 94) and July 26 (Report 96).
I speculate that still-unavailable Report 96 elaborated on Report 95, which has become available to the public. Report 95 includes the following passage (emphasis added):
I speculate that the still-unavailable Report 96 provided a detailed elaboration of Report 95's accusation the the Russian regime had accomplished "the recent leak of embarrassing e-mail messages" with the collaboration of a network that included "firstly, agents / facilitators within the Democratic Party structure itself; secondly Russian émigré and associated offensive cyber operators based in the U.S."
1) Report 80, dated June 20, 2016According to the Horowitz report, the first time when FBI Headquarters received any of those Dossier reports was on September 19, 2016. That delivery comprised just six Dossier reports -- 80, 94, 95, 100, 101, and 102 (Horowitz page 100). On that date, therefore, the series included a particular four-report gap -- Reports 96, 97, 98 and 99. On some later, unknown date, Report 97 too was delivered to FBI Headquarters.
2) Report 86, dated July 26, 2015 (twenty-fifteen)
3) Report 94, dated July 19, 2016
4) Report 95, undated, but apparently written in late-July 2016
5) Report 97, dated July 30, 2016
6) Report 100, dated August 5, 2016
7) Report 101, dated August 10, 2016
8) Report 102, dated August 10, 2016
9) Report 105, dated August 22, 2016
10) Report 111, dated September 14, 2016
11) Report 112, dated September 14, 2016
12) Report 113, dated September 14, 2016
======
In this blog, I have speculated that all these 12 reports (except Reports 80 and 86) were delivered unofficially to the FBI Counterintelligence Chief promptly after their publication dates. For example, Report 94 was delivered to that Chief within a few days of its publication date -- July 19 -- but its delivery was not recorded according to FBI procedures. Report 94 was delivered officially -- recorded according to FBI procedures -- on September 19. On that official delivery date, however, the Counterintelligence Chief already had possessed the report unofficially since mid-July.
The reason for the abnormal delivery of Dossier reports was to enable the FBI to deny its knowledge of some of the reports.
For example, Steele finished writing Report 94 (and assigned that number to the report) on July 19. Within a few days, that report was delivered to the Counterintelligence Chief, but that delivery was not recorded according to FBI procedures.
By a different delivery method, Report 94 was delivered on July 28 to the Chief Division Counsel FBI New York Field Office (NYFO) -- not to FBI Headquarters. This delivery to the NYFO was recorded according to FBI procedures. On July 28, therefore, the FBI could no longer deny that the FBI -- in particular, the FBI NYFO -- had received Report 94, but it still could deny that FBI Headquarters had received it. (When the NYFO received any Dossier reports, the NYFO simply hid them in a safe until further instructions were received from from FBI Headquarters.)
Later, in mid-September, someone decided that the current situation allowed Report 94 to be delivered officially to FBI Headquarters. This belated delivery was recorded in accordance with FBI procedures on September 19. From this latter date forward, FBI headquarters would have to acknowledge that it had been informed about Report 94.
======
The delivery of Report 97 was different. Like Report 94, it was delivered to the Counter-intelligence Chief promptly and unofficially. However, Report 97 was not delivered to the NYFO. Therefore, the FBI created no record at all that Report 97 had been delivered to any FBI office at all. Officially, Report 97 was delivered to the FBI the first time on September 19. Until that latter date, the FBI avoided creating any record indicating any FBI knowledge of the existence of Report 97.
I speculated in a previous blog article that the FBI might be more embarrassed by Report 97 (than, for example, by Report 94), because Report 97 indicated that Christopher Steele was obtaining information from sources with inside knowledge about Trump's election-campaign staff. In particular, Report 97 claimed to be based partially on reports from "a Russian émigré figure close to the Republican US presidential candidate Donald Trump's campaign team". That phrase -- which eventually might cause the public to suspect that the FBI was collecting information from inside Trump's campaign staff -- might have caused the decision in July 2016 to not send Report 97 to the NYFO.
By mid-September, however, the situation had changed. Now the FBI Headquarters was trying to overcome objections to its application for a FISA warrant in order to collect information about Trump's supporters. Therefore, FBI Headquarters now had to receive officially some Dossier reports. In particular, Reports 97 now seemed to FBI Headquarters to be more useful than problematical. After all, the Russian émigré reported the following (emphasis added):
Speaking in confidence to a trusted associate in late July 2016, a Russian émigré figure close to the Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s campaign team commented on the fallout from publicity surrounding the Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mail hacking scandal. The émigré said there was a high level of anxiety within the TRUMP team as a result of various accusations levelled against them and indications from the Kremlin that President PUTIN and others in the leadership thought things had gone too far now and risked spiralling out of control.
Continuing on this theme, the émigré associate of TRUMP opined that the Kremlin wanted the situation to calm but for ‘plausible deniability’ to be maintained concerning its (extensive) pro-TRUMP and anti-CLINTON operations. S/he therefore judged that it was unlikely these would be ratcheted up, at least for the time being.
However, in terms of established operational liaison between the TRUMP team and the Kremlin, the émigré confirmed that an intelligence exchange had been running between them for at least 8 years. Within this context PUTIN’s priority requirement had been for intelligence on the activities, business and otherwise, in the US of leading Russian oligarchs and their families. TRUMP and his associates duly had obtained and supplied the Kremlin with this information.
Finally, the émigré said s/he understood the Kremlin had more intelligence on CLINTON and her campaign but he did not know the details or when or if it would be released. As far as ‘kompromat’ (compromising information) on TRUMP were concerned, although there was plenty of this, he understood the Kremlin had given its word that it would not be deployed against the Republican presidential candidate given how helpful and co-operative his team had been over several years, and particularly of late.
In mid-September, FBI Headquarters foresaw a need to use this information in order to obtain a FISA warrant. Therefore, FBI Headquarters belatedly arranged for Report 97 to be received in accordance with FBI procedures. Keep in mind, though, that the Counterintelligence Chief actually had received Report 97 already in July.
==========
Reports 96, 98 and 99 remain mysterious to the present day. The only facts that might be deduced about those three reports is their approximate dates.
* Report 96 must be dated between July 19 (Report 94) and July 30 (Report 97).
* Reports 98 and 99 must be dated between July 30 (Report 97) and August 5 (Report 100).
Now I have come across a clue to the date of Report 96. I learned recently that journalist Jane Mayer -- who had interviewed Steele at length -- mentioned in an article that Steele had published an article dated July 26, 2016. Mayer's article was titled Christopher Steele, the Man Behind the Trump Dossier, and it was published by The New Yorker magazine on March 5, 2018. The relevant paragraph (emphasis added):
On July 26, 2016, after WikiLeaks disseminated the D.N.C. e-mails, Steele filed yet another memo, this time claiming that the Kremlin was “behind” the hacking, which was part of a Russian cyber war against Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Many of the details seemed far-fetched: Steele’s sources claimed that the digital attack involved agents “within the Democratic Party structure itself,” as well as Russian émigrés in the U.S. and “associated offensive cyber operators.”
Since Dossier Report 95 is not dated, the report dated July 26, 2016 must be Report 96. Although Report 96 never has become available to the public, Mayer apparently was told something about it by Steele himself.
If Mayer's summary of Report 96 is correct, then that report's huge problem for the FBI is its indication that some Democrat officials ("agents within the Democratic Party structure itself") had participated in the supposed hacking of the Democrat National Committee's computers in the spring of 2016. Therefore, Report 96 might be extremely damaging to the FBI's efforts to blame such hacking on an imaginary collaboration between Russian Intelligence and Donald Trump. For that reason, the FBI has kept Report 96 secret to the present day.
==========
The dating of Report 96 to July 26 indicates that undated Report 95 was written between July 19 (Report 94) and July 26 (Report 96).
I speculate that still-unavailable Report 96 elaborated on Report 95, which has become available to the public. Report 95 includes the following passage (emphasis added):
... Source E, acknowledged that the Russian regime had been behind the recent leak of embarrassing e-mail messages, emanating from the Democratic National Committee (DNC), to the WikiLeaks platform. ....
In the wider context of TRUMP campaign/Kremlin co-operation, Source E claimed that the intelligence network being used against CLINTON comprised three elements. Firstly there were agents / facilitators within the Democratic Party structure itself; secondly Russian émigré and associated offensive cyber operators based in the U.S.; and thirdly, state- sponsored cyber operatives working in Russia. All three elements had played an important role to date. ...
I speculate that the still-unavailable Report 96 provided a detailed elaboration of Report 95's accusation the the Russian regime had accomplished "the recent leak of embarrassing e-mail messages" with the collaboration of a network that included "firstly, agents / facilitators within the Democratic Party structure itself; secondly Russian émigré and associated offensive cyber operators based in the U.S."
Sunday, September 19, 2021
Steele's Dossier Report About Alfa Bank -- Part 1
On September 19, 2016, Michael Sussman met with FBI official James Baker to inform that the Russia-based Alfa Bank seemed to be in secret communication with Trump Tower.
Five days earlier, on September 14, Christopher Steele had issued his Dossier Report 112 about that bank's owners -- which Steele spelled as Alpha Group.
There are hundreds of thousands of large businesses in Russia. There was no obvious reason why this particular Russian business -- Alpha Group -- had occupied Steele's attention, time and effort during the first half of September 2016. Nothing in this Dossier report seems to be related to Donald Trump or even to US politics.
It seems that Steele had been assigned to write a report urgently about Alfa Bank, but he could not find anything interesting to write about the bank itself. Rather, he could concoct only some insinuations about various Alpha Group officials who were alleged to be involved in some corrupt relationships with Vladimir Putin.
=======
The report's text :
When Steele finished his Report 112 on September 14, none of his Dossier reports had been officially delivered to FBI Headquarters.
According to the FBI's official story -- told in the Horowitz Report -- Steele had begun delivering his Dossier reports on July 5, 2016, to FBI official Michael Gaeta, who was based at the US Embassy in Rome, Italy. Then Gaeta sent the reports to the FBI's New York Field Office (NYFO), where they were stored by the NYFO Chief Division Counsel, who did nothing with them.
Not until September 19 -- the very same day that Sussman met with Baker -- were the first six Dossier reports officially delivered to FBI Headquarters in Washington DC. These six reports were 80, 94, 95, 100, 101 and 102. In other words, the delivered reports did not include Report 112, which Steele had finished four days earlier.
=======
In my previous blog articles about Gaeta, I have suggested that his Rome Embassy position -- in which he supposedly worked for the FBI Legate -- was a cover for his real assignment, which was to report secretly to the FBI Counterintelligence Chief. Gaeta actually sent all the Dossier reports immediately and directly to the FBI Counterintelligence Chief. Gaeta sent just a few of the Dossier reports to the NYFO as a plausible-deniability ruse about what he actually was doing -- which essentially was collecting dirt in Europe about Trump.
In mid-September, however, a decision was made within the FBI's top leadership to end this ruse. More specifically, a decision was made to begin sending the Dossier reports officially to FBI Headquarters. Report 112 still had not reached the NYFO office, so that particular report was not included in the first reports that were delivered to FBI Headquarters on September 19.
However, the FBI decision-makers had been told that Steele already had completed one report about Alfa Bank and intended to write more such reports. From now on, Gaeta would send Steele's reports immediately and directly to FBI Headquarters, which would officially log the reports in and then disseminate them widely to Intelligence analysts. Information about Alfa Bank and Trump had to be analyzed and developed by the US Intelligence Community with maximum efficiency.
======
Continued in Part 2
Five days earlier, on September 14, Christopher Steele had issued his Dossier Report 112 about that bank's owners -- which Steele spelled as Alpha Group.
There are hundreds of thousands of large businesses in Russia. There was no obvious reason why this particular Russian business -- Alpha Group -- had occupied Steele's attention, time and effort during the first half of September 2016. Nothing in this Dossier report seems to be related to Donald Trump or even to US politics.
It seems that Steele had been assigned to write a report urgently about Alfa Bank, but he could not find anything interesting to write about the bank itself. Rather, he could concoct only some insinuations about various Alpha Group officials who were alleged to be involved in some corrupt relationships with Vladimir Putin.
=======
The report's text :
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KREMLIN-ALPHA GROUP OPERATION (SEPTEMBER 14, 2016)=======
Summary
- Top level Russian official confirms current closeness of Alpha Group-PUTIN relationship. Significant favours continue to be done in both directions and FRIDMAN and AVEN still giving informal advice to PUTIN, especially on the US
- Key intermediary in PUTIN-Alpha relationship identified as Oleg GOVORUN, currently Head of a Presidential Administration department but throughout the 1990s, the Alpha executive who delivered illicit cash directly to PUTIN
– PUTIN personally unbothered about Alpha’s current lack of investment in Russia but under pressure from colleagues over this and able to exploit it as lever over Alpha interlocutors
Detail
1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a top level Russian government Official commented on the history and current state of relations between President PUTIN and the Alpha Group of businesses led by oligarchs Mikhail FRIDMAN, Petr AVEN and German KHAN. The Russian government figure reported that although they had had their ups and downs, the leading figures in Alpha currently were on very good terms with PUTIN. Significant favours continued to be done in both directions, primarily political ones for PUTIN and business/legal ones for Alpha. Also, RIDMAN and AVEN continued to give informal advice to PUTIN on foreign policy, and especially about the US where he distrusted advice being given to him by officials.
2. Although FRIDMAN recently had met directly with PUTIN in Russia, much of the dialogue and business between them was mediated through a senior Presidential Administration Official, Oleg GOVORUN, who currently headed the department therein responsible for Social Co-operation with the CIS. GOVORUN was trusted by PUTIN and recently had accompanied him to Uzbekistan to pay respects at the tomb of former president KARIMOV. However according to the top level Russian government official, during the 1990s GOVORUN had been Head of Government Relations at Alpha Group and in reality, the ‘driver’ and ‘bag carrier’ used by FRIDMAN and AVEN to deliver large amounts of illicit cash to the Russian president, at that time deputy Mayor of St Petersburg. Given that and the continuing sensitivity of the relationship, and need for plausible deniability, much of the contact between them was now indirect and entrusted to the relatively low profile GOVORUN.
3. The top level Russian government official described the PUTlN-Alpha relationship as both carrot and stick. Alpha held ‘kompromat’ on PUTIN and his corrupt business activities from the 1990s whilst although not personally overly bothered by Alpha’s failure to reinvest the proceeds of its TNK oil company sale into the Russian economy since, the Russian president was able to use pressure on this count from senior Kremlin colleagues as a lever on FRIDMAN and AVEN to make them do his political bidding.
14 September 2016
When Steele finished his Report 112 on September 14, none of his Dossier reports had been officially delivered to FBI Headquarters.
According to the FBI's official story -- told in the Horowitz Report -- Steele had begun delivering his Dossier reports on July 5, 2016, to FBI official Michael Gaeta, who was based at the US Embassy in Rome, Italy. Then Gaeta sent the reports to the FBI's New York Field Office (NYFO), where they were stored by the NYFO Chief Division Counsel, who did nothing with them.
Not until September 19 -- the very same day that Sussman met with Baker -- were the first six Dossier reports officially delivered to FBI Headquarters in Washington DC. These six reports were 80, 94, 95, 100, 101 and 102. In other words, the delivered reports did not include Report 112, which Steele had finished four days earlier.
=======
In my previous blog articles about Gaeta, I have suggested that his Rome Embassy position -- in which he supposedly worked for the FBI Legate -- was a cover for his real assignment, which was to report secretly to the FBI Counterintelligence Chief. Gaeta actually sent all the Dossier reports immediately and directly to the FBI Counterintelligence Chief. Gaeta sent just a few of the Dossier reports to the NYFO as a plausible-deniability ruse about what he actually was doing -- which essentially was collecting dirt in Europe about Trump.
In mid-September, however, a decision was made within the FBI's top leadership to end this ruse. More specifically, a decision was made to begin sending the Dossier reports officially to FBI Headquarters. Report 112 still had not reached the NYFO office, so that particular report was not included in the first reports that were delivered to FBI Headquarters on September 19.
However, the FBI decision-makers had been told that Steele already had completed one report about Alfa Bank and intended to write more such reports. From now on, Gaeta would send Steele's reports immediately and directly to FBI Headquarters, which would officially log the reports in and then disseminate them widely to Intelligence analysts. Information about Alfa Bank and Trump had to be analyzed and developed by the US Intelligence Community with maximum efficiency.
======
Continued in Part 2
Sunday, August 29, 2021
Yuri Shvets and FBI Counterintelligence -- Part 2
My previous post, Part 1 concluded as follows:
Now in this new blog post, I will describe Shvets's information that was valuable to FBI Counterintelligence.
About 45 pages (89-134) of of Shvets's book Washington Station is about his conversations with a fellow KGB officer named Valentin Aksilenko. When they talked in Moscow in about 1986, Aksilenko told Shvets how he had recruited a secret agent in 1979 while being stationed as a KGB officer in Washington DC.
The agent -- called "Bill" in Shvets's book -- was a Peruvian immigrant, about 40 years old, living in Washington DC. Aksilenko happened to become acquainted with Bill at a protest against US policies in El Salvador. Bill invited Aksilenko to his home and subsequently told him that he worked as a janitor cleaning the offices of some think-tanks that studied national-security issues. Bill had begun to collect various documents that he found in these offices. Bill offered to provide such documents to Aksilenko.
In the book's 45 pages about Aksilenko's collection of information from Bill, Shvets writes in much detail about how Aksilenko evaded the efforts of FBI counterintelligence to surveil Aksilenko's espionage activities.
In his book, Shvets writes much about KGB's discovery of the treason of two officers -- Colonel Vitaly Yurchenko and Major Sergey Motorin -- which caused turmoil in the KGB during Shvets's time in the "Washington Station".
In general, Shvets knew a lot about many matters that were extremely interesting for FBI Counterintelligence. In 1994 he wanted to settle in the United States with his wife and children and was impoverished. In his situation, he surely told FBI Counterintelligence at least everything that he later wrote in his book.
Already in 1994, FBI Counterintelligence was using Shvets's manuscript to investigate indications that various Americans were working for Russian Intelligence:
... I speculate that [Yuri] Shvets managed to bring his family into the USA on his own resources in early 1994. At that time, he intended to make a career as a free-lance writer. However, the rejection in his initial request for political asylum in April 1994 compelled him to reveal himself to the FBI in April 1994. Following that revelation, he was granted political asylum in May 1994, but agreed to provide all his knowledge to the FBI Counterintelligence Division.
Now in this new blog post, I will describe Shvets's information that was valuable to FBI Counterintelligence.
About 45 pages (89-134) of of Shvets's book Washington Station is about his conversations with a fellow KGB officer named Valentin Aksilenko. When they talked in Moscow in about 1986, Aksilenko told Shvets how he had recruited a secret agent in 1979 while being stationed as a KGB officer in Washington DC.
 |
| Valentin Aksilenko |
The agent -- called "Bill" in Shvets's book -- was a Peruvian immigrant, about 40 years old, living in Washington DC. Aksilenko happened to become acquainted with Bill at a protest against US policies in El Salvador. Bill invited Aksilenko to his home and subsequently told him that he worked as a janitor cleaning the offices of some think-tanks that studied national-security issues. Bill had begun to collect various documents that he found in these offices. Bill offered to provide such documents to Aksilenko.
The garbage can turned out to have a pot of gold on the bottom. Bill began delivering material on military and strategic issues that would have been designated top priority by any intelligence service. ....
Bill generally delivered such a huge volume of documents that there was no way they could all be sent over to Moscow. Valentin selected the most interesting papers ....
As he perused Bill's material, Valentin never failed to marvel at ow lackadaisical the American system of classified record-keeping was. ...
... thanks to his effort, the KGB obtained an enormous amount of information on the following Pentagon projects:
* The MX missile, from the design stage to the shot drawings ....;
* air-, sea- and land-based cruise missiles, particularly the Tomahawk;
* the latest-generation single-warhead Midgetman missile;
* The Trident SLBM, designated for the new generation of US submarines;
* the latest strategic bomber, initially designated as a "penetrating bomber," but subsequently renamed the Stealth bomber;
* AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) and NAVSTAR systems;
* anti-aircraft missile complexes;
* analytical reports on war games and staff exercises ...;
The [Soviet] intelligence analysts were amazed at the volume and quality of the material delivered by Bill. They simply could not understand how documents of that kind had ended up in the trash can. ...
To put things into proper perspective, in 1982, Bill's documents accounted for over 50 percent of the overall volume of information in that category [military-strategic information].
In the book's 45 pages about Aksilenko's collection of information from Bill, Shvets writes in much detail about how Aksilenko evaded the efforts of FBI counterintelligence to surveil Aksilenko's espionage activities.
In his book, Shvets writes much about KGB's discovery of the treason of two officers -- Colonel Vitaly Yurchenko and Major Sergey Motorin -- which caused turmoil in the KGB during Shvets's time in the "Washington Station".
In general, Shvets knew a lot about many matters that were extremely interesting for FBI Counterintelligence. In 1994 he wanted to settle in the United States with his wife and children and was impoverished. In his situation, he surely told FBI Counterintelligence at least everything that he later wrote in his book.
Already in 1994, FBI Counterintelligence was using Shvets's manuscript to investigate indications that various Americans were working for Russian Intelligence:
Guided by the unpublished book of a former Soviet spy, the FBI is urgently looking into whether the KGB recruited a Carter administration official to steal secrets for Moscow, law-enforcement officials have revealed.
The central accusation is that the American official, after leaving government service, worked secretly for the KGB, the Soviet counterpart to the CIA. He is said to have seduced the daughter of a CIA employee and to have pressured the employee into supplying him with tidbits of classified information, which he then passed on to Moscow.
The FBI still does not know if these events happened, and some officials are skeptical. But the FBI has taken the accusations seriously enough to have assigned several agents to investigate them, racing against the deadline of publisher Simon & Schuster.
The publisher plans to put the story, along with other tales of Cold War espionage, on bookstore shelves next month [May 1994]. ...
FBI officials are privately worried that disclosures prompted by the book might compromise their investigation, which remains far from complete. Officially, however, the FBI had nothing to say about the investigation. ...
... in February 1993, Valentin Aksilenko, a former senior KGB official who in the early 1980s helped manage North American espionage operations for the Kremlin, went to the lobby of Moscow's Radisson Hotel, a gathering place for entrepreneurs eager to cut a deal with Moscow in the post-Soviet era.
His errand: a social meeting with an American businesswoman, Brenda Lipson, who had befriended Aksilenko on one of his Washington tours when the KGB official was working under the cover of a commercial attache to the Soviet Embassy.
Fluent in Russian, she established her own business, East-West Services Associates, in 1992 and began a series of business trips to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It was she who sought Aksilenko, Lipson said in an interview last week.
Talking there in the crowded lobby in a scene that might have come straight from the John Le Carré spy novel The Russia House, Aksilenko confided that he had been a spy and that he was "so glad to be out of intelligence."
As they were about to part, he dropped his bombshell: He asked her help in publishing a novel "written by a friend." The friend was Shvets.
Shvets is a very intelligent, credible and admirable person who knew much that was very valuable to FBI Counterintelligence. That is the main concept that I am trying to communicate here. In 1994, FBI Counterintelligence believed practically everything that Shvets said about Russian Intelligence.
A couple decades later, FBI Counterintelligence likewise believed practically everything that Shvets alleged about Russian Intelligence recruiting of Donald Trump.
To be continued
A couple decades later, FBI Counterintelligence likewise believed practically everything that Shvets alleged about Russian Intelligence recruiting of Donald Trump.
To be continued
Monday, August 23, 2021
The NYT Special Section About the January 6 Event
On August 15, The New York Times published a special section about the riot that took place at the Capitol Building on January 6, 2021. I read that section yesterday, and I now have a much better understanding of that riot.
Therefore, I no longer think that the Ashli Babbitt incident was staged to some extent.
Maybe you can read that section in a library. Online versions are here and here, but you might have to jump through some hoops to view them.
Sunday, August 1, 2021
Some Answers to My Questions about the Babbitt Incident
This post follows up My Questions About the Ashli Babbitt Incident.
On April 14, 2021, the United States District Attorney's Office of the District of Columbia published an article titled Department of Justice Closes Investigation into the Death of Ashli Babbitt (called below "the investigation article"). That article includes the following passage (emphasis added):
I interpret this passage to mean that USCP officers constructed the barrier after a decision had been made to evacuate Members from the Chamber. In other words, the barrier had not been constructed during, say, the preceding night or morning. I would like my interpretation to be confirmed.
I would like to know also whether similar barriers were constructed at other of the multiple doorways.
The investigation article continues (emphasis added):
What I called the SWAT team was actually called a USCP emergency response team.
I interpret this passage to mean that a decision was made that the USCP officers positioned at the door were not able to stop the attack on the doors and so they were told to evacuate because a USCP emergency response team was coming to subdue the mob.
While that team was advancing, Babbitt was shot, and so the team stopped to deal with her.
This question remains unanswered. I think the (USCP?) officer should have come out into the corridor and confronted the protesters face-to-face. Furthermore, he should have fired a warning shot.
An anonymous commenter wrote under a previous post:
That explanation is plausible. Perhaps the bullet and most of the blood ended up in the backpack.
I remain puzzled by the assertion that the bullet entered Babbitt's left shoulder, because I do not see a wound there. Look for yourself on the Wooz News video beginning at 19:36.
These questions remain unanswered.
I don't make a big deal out of this question. The guy who claims he saw an effort to resuscitate Babbitt an hour after the shooting might simply be mistaken. Perhaps the person he saw was some other person who had been injured.
I now am largely satisfied that the Ashli Babbitt incident was not staged.
However, I remain very skeptical about our government leaders, especially in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Quite a lot of such leaders believed and still believe that Donald Trump is a secret agent of Russian Intelligence. Therefore, those leaders have felt morally justified to use dirty tricks to ruin Trump and to ruin also his associates and supporters.
Such a dirty-tricks operation was Robert Mueller's Special Counsel investigation, which was led and staffed largely by Trump-hating FBI officials. That particular operation's real purpose was to lure President Trump into an obstruction-of-justice situation that would enable Congress to impeach and remove Trump from his elected position.
Mueller's operation failed, but malicious and devious efforts efforts to ruin Trump and his supporters have continued to the very end of his Presidency and to the present day. In this situation, many citizens think it's quite plausible that FBI officials collaborated with other Trump-hating government officials to stage the Babbitt incident.
When and by whom was the furniture barricade constructed?
On April 14, 2021, the United States District Attorney's Office of the District of Columbia published an article titled Department of Justice Closes Investigation into the Death of Ashli Babbitt (called below "the investigation article"). That article includes the following passage (emphasis added):
... Ms. Babbitt was among a mob of people that entered the Capitol building and gained access to a hallway outside “Speaker’s Lobby,” which leads to the Chamber of the U.S. House of Representatives. At the time, the USCP [US Capitol Police]was evacuating Members from the Chamber, which the mob was trying to enter from multiple doorways. USCP officers used furniture to barricade a set of glass doors separating the hallway and Speaker’s Lobby to try and stop the mob from entering the Speaker’s Lobby and the Chamber, and three officers positioned themselves between the doors and the mob.
I interpret this passage to mean that USCP officers constructed the barrier after a decision had been made to evacuate Members from the Chamber. In other words, the barrier had not been constructed during, say, the preceding night or morning. I would like my interpretation to be confirmed.
I would like to know also whether similar barriers were constructed at other of the multiple doorways.
Why was the SWAT team not stationed in front of the portal?
Why did the four officials leave the portal?
Why didn't the SWAT team stop the attack on the portal?
Why did the four officials leave the portal?
Why didn't the SWAT team stop the attack on the portal?
The investigation article continues (emphasis added):
Members of the mob attempted to break through the doors by striking them and breaking the glass with their hands, flagpoles, helmets, and other objects. Eventually, the three USCP officers positioned outside the doors were forced to evacuate.
As members of the mob continued to strike the glass doors, Ms. Babbitt attempted to climb through one of the doors where glass was broken out. An officer inside the Speaker’s Lobby fired one round from his service pistol, striking Ms. Babbitt in the left shoulder, causing her to fall back from the doorway and onto the floor. A USCP emergency response team, which had begun making its way into the hallway to try and subdue the mob, administered aid to Ms. Babbitt, who was transported to Washington Hospital Center, where she succumbed to her injuries.
What I called the SWAT team was actually called a USCP emergency response team.
I interpret this passage to mean that a decision was made that the USCP officers positioned at the door were not able to stop the attack on the doors and so they were told to evacuate because a USCP emergency response team was coming to subdue the mob.
While that team was advancing, Babbitt was shot, and so the team stopped to deal with her.
Why didn't the gunman come out into the empty corridor ?
This question remains unanswered. I think the (USCP?) officer should have come out into the corridor and confronted the protesters face-to-face. Furthermore, he should have fired a warning shot.
Why did so little blood come out of Babbitt's neck wound?
An anonymous commenter wrote under a previous post:
... [Babbitt was a] very small woman, wearing a rather thick backpack that covered her back, it is possible the shot was not through-and-through (the bullet lodged against a bone) or that the bullet exited into her backpack. The blood we saw streamed from her front. She had on a winter jacket, so that could have kept down any spatter from the front. ...
That explanation is plausible. Perhaps the bullet and most of the blood ended up in the backpack.
I remain puzzled by the assertion that the bullet entered Babbitt's left shoulder, because I do not see a wound there. Look for yourself on the Wooz News video beginning at 19:36.
What is the legal status of Rufio and Yellow?
Why was Babbitt carried downstairs?
Why was Babbitt wearing a back-brace?
Why was Babbitt carried downstairs?
Why was Babbitt wearing a back-brace?
These questions remain unanswered.
When was Babbitt obviously dead?
I don't make a big deal out of this question. The guy who claims he saw an effort to resuscitate Babbitt an hour after the shooting might simply be mistaken. Perhaps the person he saw was some other person who had been injured.
I now am largely satisfied that the Ashli Babbitt incident was not staged.
However, I remain very skeptical about our government leaders, especially in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Quite a lot of such leaders believed and still believe that Donald Trump is a secret agent of Russian Intelligence. Therefore, those leaders have felt morally justified to use dirty tricks to ruin Trump and to ruin also his associates and supporters.
Such a dirty-tricks operation was Robert Mueller's Special Counsel investigation, which was led and staffed largely by Trump-hating FBI officials. That particular operation's real purpose was to lure President Trump into an obstruction-of-justice situation that would enable Congress to impeach and remove Trump from his elected position.
Mueller's operation failed, but malicious and devious efforts efforts to ruin Trump and his supporters have continued to the very end of his Presidency and to the present day. In this situation, many citizens think it's quite plausible that FBI officials collaborated with other Trump-hating government officials to stage the Babbitt incident.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)